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Purpose of Thesis 
This is a discussion of the evolution of the office of 
resident ambassador in fifteenth century Italy. The purpose 
of this paper is to make clear the extreme differences between 
the medieval ad hoc ambassador and the resident. To that end, 
the status of medieval ambassadors is briefly discussed, followed 
.~ by a listing of possible precursors to Renaissance resident 
ambassadors. The actual evolution of the system in Italy is 
then outlined, and then the effects of this new system on 
diplomatic immunity is discussed in order to emphasize the 
ideological differences inherent in Renaissance diplomacy. 
The Resident Ambassador 
During the fifteenth century, diplomacy changed in a number 
of ways, in practice, in theory, in scope, in intensity, and, 
to some extent, in purpose. All of these changes are 
inextricably bound up in the new office of resident ambassador 
which began to appear in Italy in the second quarter of the 
century and then spread beyond the Alps around the turn of the 
sixteenth century. These new resident ambassadors are often 
treated as merely another development in the long line of 
political representatives that includes the late medieval envoy 
or herald, the Roman legatus, the classical Greek herald, and 
so on, but, in fact, the differences between the fifteenth (or 
sixteenth) century resident ambassador and any of the above 
are so striking that the office of resident ambassador should 
be considered a completely new development with few, if any, 
precedents and little connection to earlier ambassadors. Indeed, 
rulers of the time recognized this and often continued to send 
special ad hoc ambassadors even to courts where they maintained 
a resident. 1 
A brief comparison of two representatives, one a medieval 
envoy and one a resident ambassador, should serve to make these 
differences apparent. First, let us look at a very famous 
medieval envoy, Geoffroy de Villehardouin who, at the turn of 
the thirteenth century, was one of the envoys entrusted with 
securing transport and aid from the Venetians for those Frenchmen 
who took up the cross of the ill-fated Fourth Crusade. Geoffroy 
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tells us, in his account of the conquest of Constantinople, 
that "they [the Crusaders] would send the best envoys they could 
find to make all arrangements for them, with full power to settle 
what should be done, exactly as if they were their lords in 
person.,,2 The representative character of the envoys is typical 
of medieval practice and explains the considerable pomp and 
ceremony surrounding the arrival of ambassadors and care taken 
to provide them with a suitable retinue. For example, a Venetian 
act of 1284 requires all foreign ambassadors arriving at Venice 
to be met by four Venetian ambassadors, all of whom should be 
nobles, one of whom must be one of the heads of the Forty and 
the other who must be an advocate of the commune. 3 In other 
courts, members of the royal family might be sent to escort 
arriving ambassadors. As for suitable retinues, French 
ambassadors in 1440 were issued a safe-conduct by Henry VI that 
included 384 persons. 4 
That Villehardouin and his associates were given full power 
to negotiate and conclude is more unusual, however. Ordinarily, 
envoys were sent either to negotiate or conclude, but not both. 
"Negotiations were carried out by nuncii [envoys], the terms 
referred to the principals and approved by them, and the 
conventions could then be concluded by nuncii," but any agreement 
had to be accepted by the principals before a nuncius could 
conclude. S It was not unknown, however, for envoys to carry 
credentials with full powers. These were usually referred to 
in the Latin as plena et libera potestas, mandatum, or procuratio 
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and reserved for matters of lesser importance. 6 
When the envoys arrived at Venice, they gave their letters 
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of credence to the Doge. Letters of credence were what made 
medieval envoys official, assuring the recipient that the envoys 
were truly the representatives of their master and sometimes 
outlining their mission and the powers assigned to them. It 
is impossible to overemphasize the importance of such letters. 
In fact, they are directly linked to the original meaning of 
the very word "diplomacy." It comes from the Greek diploun, 
which means "to fold" and refers to the passports and way-bills 
of the Roman Empire. These were double metal plates, folded, 
and sewn together. They were called "diplomas" and were as 
essential to the Roman legatus as letters of credence were for 
the medieval (and, indeed, Renaissance) ambassador. 8 Letters 
of credence were used throughout the period under discussion 
for official agents, but, later on, they were usually 
supplemented with detailed written instructions. As European 
nations became more centralized and bureaucratic, their envoys 
were given less and less leeway about their specific mission 
and powers. 
Another thing that should be noted about Villehardouin's 
mission, though he does not mention it, is that he and his party 
were probably the guests of the Doge. The reason for this is 
closely linked to the perceived purpose of ambassadors in the 
medieval period. It is also closely linked to the medieval 
logic behind diplomatic immunity. Bernard du Rosier, who wrote 
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a treatise on ambassadors in 1436, claimed that anyone who 
hinders an ambassador or prevents him in any way from performing 
his duties deserves punishment, for the ambassador is not just 
in the service of one particular king. His duty is to the higher 
cause of peace throughout the Respublica Christiana. 9 This 
Respublica Christiana is a particularly foreign concept to most 
modern ears. According to Franklin Le Van Baumer "Christendom 
is a European church-state whose members, whatever their patria, 
are subject to a central goverment. Christendom is a universal 
monarchy, specifically the divine-right papal monarchy, whose 
imperatives, to be sure, do not extend to the purely political 
affairs of princes but which clearly possesses within the 
spiritual realm a potestas jurisdictionis as well as a potestas 
ordinis.,,10 Because ambassadors were said to serve the good 
of all, not just their principals, it was the duty of the 
individual who accepted them to see to their upkeep. In the 
later period of the middle ages, Venice, as well as many other 
nations, was forced to lessen the number of embassies it would 
receive because of the cost of doing so.11 
Now let us turn to a typical Renaissance resident 
ambassador, Dr. Roderigo Gonzalvo de Puebla, the first Spanish 
resident ambassador to England. He was a man of middling social 
status, quite unlike the Dukes and Archbishops who make up the 
rolls of medieval ambassadors. He was a doctor of laws, which 
was increasingly necessary as Renaissance embassies lost their 
figureheads and the clerks took over. He was also a canon out 
-5 
of orders, a useful thing to be in a time when diplomatic 
immunity was better honored in the breach than the observance. 12 
However, as time passed, churchmen were sent less frequently 
for they occasionally concerned themselves more with the pope's 
agenda than with their king's. 
De Puebla, I think, could not be accused of this. He was 
first sent in 1487 to negotiate an alliance with England against 
France, but he was not accredited as resident until 1495. He 
was instrumental in negotiating the marriage between Prince 
Arthur and the Princess Catherine. Until Henry VIII decided 
to annul his marraige to Catherine of Aragon, which was certainly 
no fault of de Puebla's, relations between Spain and England 
were on a surer footing than they had been for almost a hundred 
13 years before. 
As a resident, de Puebla's situation was far different 
from that of Villehardouin. He arrived at the English court 
with letters of credence, but no instructions, written or oral, 
besides maintaining the English alliance against France. While 
he was the one who negotiated the marriage contract of Catherine, 
it was a special envoy who came to make final revisions and 
conclude the negotiations. In short, de Puebla's powers were 
severely limited, a situation typical of the resident ambassador 
who was far from his court for long periods of time and, 
therefore, ill-informed of his nation's policies. This was 
particularly true of the ambassadors of Philip II of Spain, 
who liked to handle all correspondance himself, meaning that 
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ambassadors could expect tardy replies or no replies at all 
to their reports. The former role of the ambassador, that of 
negotiating treaties and alliances, was largely left to the 
special ad hoc ambassadors who had done the job 200 years before. 
The resident ambassador had an entirely new role, that of 
information gathering. In addition, de Puebla served as an 
unofficial economic consul to the Spanish merchant community 
in London, a role no medieval ambassador would or could have 
taken on. 14 
Another striking contrast between Villehardouin and de 
Puebla is in the matter of money. Villehardouin was guested 
by the Doge, but de Puebla received nothing from the English 
court. He was paid from Spain, and his pay was always in 
arrears. This was typical of the resident ambassador, who was 
unable to petition for his payment because he was often out 
of the sight and out of the mind of his principal. The post 
of resident ambassador in this period more often than not made 
a rich man poor and a middle class man, such as de Puebla, a 
debtor. In fact, de Puebla was once threatened with debtor's 
prison in England, but he was pardoned by the king. 15 There 
is only one man that I know of who managed to make money on 
the office, Eustache Chapuys, Charles V's ambassador to Henry 
VIII from 1529 to 1545, who made enough in his career to found 
16 two colleges before his death. 
There is, of course, much more that could be said about 
each of these men, but the preceding should be enough to show 
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some of the many differences between medieval and Renaissance 
ambassadors. The medieval ambassador was, in his person, the 
direct representative of his principal, entitled to all of the 
pomp and ceremony that that implied. His function was that 
of a peacemaker, and his role was very public. The Renaissance 
ambassador, on the other hand, served as an information agent 
for his king, not a direct representative. He did not function 
as the mouthpiece of his principal but was, rather, his own 
man. As an information agent, he was no longer a public figure 
and received little in the way of ceremonials and respects. 
Also, his role often forced him to take actions against the 
general peace, a situation that undermined the theoretical basis 
of his immunity. He was, in short, the only soldier on the 
front lines in times of peace. 
It is necessary now to ask how such a radical change could 
take place in so short a time. In Italy, the shift took place 
between the last quarter of the fourteenth century and the Peace 
of Lodi in 1454. Beyond the Alps, it took even less time. 
Somewhere between the French invasion of Italy in 1494 and the 
middle of the sixteenth century the resident system became firmly 
entrenched. Many possible precedents have been put forth to 
explain how people could come to accept such a change so quickly. 
The humanists of the time, perhaps embarrassed by the newness 
of the thing, postulated that the residents were the successors 
of the Roman legati, representatives sent from the Roman 
provinces to the Senate who, after the fall of the Empire, were 
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replaced by the representatives of the new Christian states 
to the Pope. The fact, unfortunately, is that there were no 
resident embassies at the papacy before the 1430s and that they 
were discouraged even there until the sixteenth century.17 
The most promising case for a precedent to resident 
embassies is made on behalf of the Venetian baiulo, the Most 
Serene Republic's economic consul at Constantinople. Though 
this was essentially an economic post, it often happened that 
the same person was elected both ambassador and baiulo at the 
same time. However, it is also often clear that these two posts 
were held by two different men. 18 The electing of just a single 
man to both posts is more likely the result of the great distance 
to travel and the amount of time involved. Venetian patricians 
eligible and willing to take such an arduous post were very 
likely few and far in between. Because of the great amount 
of Venetian merchant activity in the Eastern Empire the baiulo 
would surely have had little time to spend on the kind of 
protracted diplomatic negotiations that went on between the 
Empire and Venice. Furthermore, it is worth noting that Venice 
was rather slow to pick up on the concept of resident 
ambassadors, not sending one to its longstanding ally Florence 
until 1448. If, indeed, the baiulo is a valid precedent, then 
Venice should have been one of the first to send residents. 
However, it is not to Venice but to Milan that one must 
look to find the first resident ambassadors. The reason for 
this is that Milan was the first to find itself in a position 
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that called for resident ambassadors, for it was not precedents 
but circumstances that made the first residents possible. The 
creation of proper circumstances took hundreds of years, 
beginning in the eleventh century when the popes first challenged 
the power of the Holy Roman Empire. This first defiance led 
to hundreds of years of conflict between the two powers that 
eventually broke the power of feudalism in northern Italy. 
Without solid overlordship, the small communities of 
northern Italy broke up into competing city-states, each 
considering itself to be a nation in its own right with its 
own army and its own form of governance. These forms of 
governance, being outside the norm of feudalism, were 
abnormalities in medieval Europe without the all important 
religious sanction of kingship. As such, they were inherently 
unstable. Each ruling group was constantly threatened by rivals 
and internal dissension, much like the governments of the third 
world are today. 'Of course, today governmental legitimacy is 
more a matter of legality and tradition than religion; but the 
effect is the same. Revolution was common, and the backing 
of the masses, especially the army, was essential. In order 
to quelch internal dissension, the rulers of these new Italian 
states resorted to an age old solution, wars of expansion. 
They gave the army something useful to do and wealth to the 
citizenry. And so Italy became a battleground. Of course, 
all these little wars were fought on an "Italian scale," without 
the bloody destruction of the Hundred Years' War happening at 
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the same time far to the north. still, where war is rampant, 
so is diplomacy. It was only natural for a state that had 
constant dealings with another to leave a permanent ambassador 
rather than go to the expense of sending a new ambassador each 
week, or each month even. There was also another new and unusual 
development that this constant warfare caused that had an effect 
on Italian diplomacy, the rule of the condottieri. As warfare 
became more and more an Italian way of life, it was increasingly 
left to mercenary troops headed by warlords known as condottieri. 
These mercenaries and their leaders were more concerned with 
making their own livelihood than dying for the sake of a foreign 
government. Because the rulers of the Italian states were well 
aware of this, they began to place more faith in diplomacy than 
warfare, feeling that the native diplomat was more trustworthy 
th th f · d tt' . 19 an e orelgn con 0 lerl. 
This alone, however, does not completely explain the 
phenomenon. After all, in the late thirteenth century, James 
II of Aragon, in his attempt to contain Frederick of Sicily, 
maintained an ambassador at Rome for ten years, and, in the 
early fourteenth century, the kings of England kept procurators 
at Paris for just as long in an attempt to settle the feudal 
difficulties between England and France. In each of these cases, 
the intensity of diplomatic relations resulted in ambassadors 
being left at their posts for long periods of time. However, 
both sets of representatives were eventually sent home, never 
to be replaced. Once their mission was complete, be it with 
11 
success or failure, they left; but, if a resident ambassador 
has to be defined, he should be defined as an ambassador who 
remains regardless of whether or not he has any specific duty 
to perform. There was another requirement to be fulfilled before 
intensive diplomacy could produce residents, and that was size. 
The small size of the Italian political arena contributed 
to the creation of resident embassies in two ways. The first 
was that it allowed for a better organization of resources. 
In the large northern states such as France, or even the 
comparatively small England, the sheer amount of land area to 
be governed discouraged highly organized central governance. 
Even active foreign offices, such as that of England in the 
thirteenth century, only had the resources to support a few 
diplomats and one or two clerks, hardly enough to maintain the 
amount of paperwork a resident could produce. 20 For example, 
one Venetian ambassador resident at Rome wrote 394 dispatches 
in 365 days.21 Money was also a problem. Diplomacy is 
expensive, and feudal kings, who could only effectively organize 
their own domains, had little money to dole out. Personnel 
was a problem. The great nobles who had once enjoyed the honor 
of representing the king's person to other states were unlikely 
to jump at the chance to remain, with little pay and less 
respect, at a hostile court for long periods of time, and the 
northern kings had yet to begin tapping the endless resources 
of their growing urban middle class. 
In Italy, all this was different. The small area of space 
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to be organized by the central government allowed its rulers 
to organize much more effectively. They were able to extract 
taxes and personnel from all of their domains, not just their 
personal holdings, and, with all of their government under their 
direct control, not that of their vassals, they were able to 
effectively organize extensive diplomatic corps and a well 
staffed foreign office, capable of handling the amount of 
paperwork generated by residents. 
In addition to this, the small size of the Italian peninsula 
made communication between a resident and his foreign office 
much quicker and easier. If, indeed, information gathering 
was a prime office of the resident, then it was essential that 
he be able to transmit that information horne while it was still 
useful to his government. Accurate information on travel times 
in this age is difficult to find, but let us suppose that it 
took four days to get from Florence to Venice and four weeks 
to get from England to Madrid. If this is the case, who is 
better informed and more able to make accurate decisions, the 
ruler Qf England or the ruler of Florence? The answer is clear. 
Expense of travel was also a factor. Not only did the Italian 
states have more liquid assets to fund their diplomacy, it cost 
less. The cost of sending a courier from Florence to Venice 
was small enough to allow messages to be sent nearly every day. 
On the other hand, sending from Madrid to London, which, for 
diplomatic couriers, often involved a sea voyage in order to 
avoid crossing French lands, was considerably more expensive. 
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Far from being able to send every day, an English ambassador 
in Madrid might save his daily letters for weeks or months before 
sending them off, a practice which inevitably made many of the 
letters obsolete before they were ever sent. 
Italy had one last advantage over its northern neighbors 
when it came to diplomacy, the Renaissance humanists. The growth 
of humanist learning in the early stages of the Renaissance 
was geared mainly toward a sense of civic duty that hearkened 
back to the Roman Republic. These men were training themselves 
to be effective governors of their city-states, and many of 
them served in public offices. Many also served as diplomats. 
Among the Florentine diplomatic corps can be found such names 
-
as Machiavelli, Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio, and Guicciardini. 
With learned diplomats such as these, it is easy to see why 
diplomacy should flower in the homeland of Renaissance 
h . 22 umanl.sm. 
And so, a number of circumstances have been listed that 
were necessary before the office of resident ambassador could 
take shape, a high level of diplomatic contact, efficient 
organization of resources and personnel, and short traveling 
distances. In the late fourteenth century, Milan fulfilled 
all of these requirements. In this period, the Visconti holdings 
were unified under Duke Giangaleazzo. with no natural boundaries 
to contain him, he then proceeded to expand across Lombardy, 
Tuscany, and the Romagna. "Giangaleazzo used diplomacy largely 
to divide and baffle his enemies and victims as a prelude, 
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accompaniment and conclusion for each of his triumphant, 
aggressive pounces, and as a shelter behind which to gather 
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strength for the next move." To organize the high level of 
diplomacy Giangaleazzo used, he had created a foreign office 
under first his secretary, Pasquino Capelli, and then his 
chamberlain, Francesco Barbavara. As far as money is concerned, 
he had plenty of that, too. As the sole ruler of Milan, he 
had unrestricted use of its revenues, whereas the rulers of 
the republics of northern Italy were often shackled when it 
came to money. 
And so, according to Mattingly, it was Duke Giangaleazzo 
of Milan who first began to use resident ambassadors. The first 
was sent to Mantua before 1375 and lasted until 1390. He also 
maintained agents at Pisa, Ferrara, Perugia, and Siena. These 
were, however, unofficial agents, not accredited ambassadors. 
They carried no papers of any kind and had no official status. 
By their contemporaries they are often referred to as "the duke's 
man here," "the duke's agent," or "the duke's spy." As 
unofficial agents, they could easily be mistaken for spies, 
but, since their line of work, their position, and their duke 
were all well known, they were not spies in the sense of the 
secret information agents used by Giangaleazzo's son, Filippo 
M 'V' t' 24 arJ.a J.scon J.. 
However, not everyone agrees that these were, indeed the 
first resident ambassadors. The most accepted candidate for 
the "first resident ambassador" is Nicodemus dei Pontremoli, 
15 
ambassador from Francesco Sforza to Cosimo de Medici, who took 
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on his post in 1446 and stayed on for 20 years. However, 
with Sforza's position in Italy being somewhat precarious, 
Pontremoli was as much an unofficial agent as those of 
Giangaleazzo 50 years before until 1450, when Sforza was finally 
in a political position to accredit an official ambassador. 
By that time, there were other official, accredited resident 
ambassadors in other Italian cities. 
Much of the difficulty with trying to identify a "first 
resident ambassador" has to do with how to define a resident 
ambassador in the first place. Mattingly, whose work Renaissance 
Diplomacy is still the definitive work in English on this 
subject, defines the resident ambassador as, "a regularly 
accredited envoy with full diplomatic status sent to remain 
at his post until recalled, in general charge of the interests 
f h · .. 1 ,,26 o 1S pr1nC1pa • However, this definition would probably 
include the ambassadors of England to France in the early 14th 
century and the ambassadors of James II of Aragon to the Pope 
in the late 13th century. After all, in both of these cases, 
ambassadors remained at their post, protecting the interests 
of their principal, until recalled, and yet Mattingly rejects 
both of these cases as even being possible precedents for 
residents, much less residents themselves. Clearly, he means 
more than he says. Paolo Selmi has expanded on his definition 
a bit by saying the office, "begins to exist when one has the 
institution of a permanent officium of which the ambassador, 
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provided with a general mandate, is the titulary during his 
assignment; and when the existence of such an officium is not 
diminished if it should be temporarily deprived of a titulary, 
when such a vacancy creates the necessity of nominating a 
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successor." In other words, the office exists regardless 
of whether or not there is an officer to perform it. This goes 
farther than Mattingly, for, by this definition, the ambassadors 
of Giangaleazzo, who were, in the first place, not formally 
accredited and, in the second place, not replaced after the 
death of Giangaleazzo, could not have been the first residents, 
as Mattingly says. To fit Selmi's definition, we must skip 
farther ahead in Milanese diplomatic history, to 1425 when 
-- Filippo Maria first exchanged residents with Sigismund, King 
of Hungary and Holy Roman Emperor elect. This embassy was the 
result of an alliance and lasted from 1425 until 1432. During 
the few years of this embassy, Filippo Maria accredited no less 
than nine ambassadors to the post, and so, while the post 
remained continuous, as Selmi insists, the personnel changed, 
indicating that the officium was not diminished by the occasional 
lack of a titulary.28 Nevertheless, I feel neither of these 
two definitions goes quite far enough, for, though the embassy 
to Sigismund is a permanent resident embassy according to both 
Mattingly and Selmi, it lasted only 7 years. Seven years hardly 
seems very permanent. The reason many of these early permanent 
resident embassies lasted only 10 to 20 years at the most is 
that they were, like the embassy to Sigismund, the result of 
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alliances, and, in a volatile political climate like that of 
Italy in the fifteenth century, alliances simply didn't tend 
to last very long. In a way, these embassies of alliance were 
much the same as the ad hoc embassies of James II of Aragon 
and the English kings mentioned above. They did have a specific 
aim, and the residents there had a very specific job, to maintain 
the alliance and coordinate the maneuvers of the two allied 
powers. How is this so different from James II maintaining 
an embassy of alliance with the Pope against Frederick of Sicily? 
There is no real difference, and so I would propose an addition 
to the above definitions. A permanent diplomatic resident is 
the titulary of an office such as those described above with 
the addition that the office is one that remains regardless 
of whether or not there is a specific strategic advantage to 
be gained by it. In other words, it endures even when there 
is no real contact between the two nations involved, no military 
alliance, no legal proceedings, no economic treaties. For an 
embassy of this kind, one must jump ahead in the diplomatic 
history of Italy to the Peace of Lodi in 1454, but first, let 
us trace the development of what I will call the precursors 
of resident agents from Giangaleazzo to the War of the Milanese 
Succession, which ended in the Peace of Lodi. 
The swift advance of Milan on the other city-states of 
Italy resulted in a flurry of alliances, and diplomatic activity, 
among her rivals. This was the period in which Coluccio Salutati 
reformed the Florentine chancery, and both the Florentines and 
-18 
Venetians, allies against Milan, stepped up their diplomatic 
activity dramatically. However, neither of these states sent 
resident ambassadors, even by Mattingly's definition. The reason 
for this is probably mostly due to the nature of government 
in each of these states. Venice was governed by a complex 
bureaucracy. Such a bureaucratic system demands that things 
be done through official channels, and, since official residents 
were as yet unknown and the kind of unofficial agents that 
Giangaleazzo used were unacceptable, the Venetians were forced 
to make do with their traditional, official ad hoc ambassadors, 
which they merely sent with increasing frequency. In Florence, 
much the same thing occurred. Florence was sometimes a republic 
and sometimes under the shadow of the Medicis during this 
century. Under the republic, it had the same difficulties as 
Venice. When the Medicis were in power, residents were rarely 
used because the Medici bank had agents in every capital of 
Europe and all of the city-states of Italy, so the Medicis had 
no real need to send resident ambassadors. Any functions the 
ambassador might perform could just as easily have been performed 
by a Medici bank representative who was already on the spot, 
and so, the two major hotbeds of Italian diplomacy in the early 
Renaissance were slow to take on the most radical change in 
diplomatic practice since the Romans, only exchanging ambassadors 
in 1448. 29 
In the instability that accompanied Filippo Maria's rise 




of their smaller neighbors. Meanwhile, to the south, in 1442, 
Alfonso the Magnanimous of Aragon finally ousted the Angevins 
from Naples. His power was never complete, and his efforts 
to organize and centralize power were continually blocked by 
the Angevin sympathizers, but the sheer size of Naples in 
relation to the other states of Italy made it a power to contend 
with once enough of its internal dissension had been eliminated 
to allow it to look north towards the rich Italian city-states. 
The Papacy was also beginning to stabilize. The Great 
Schism of the church was finally ended in 1420 when Martin V 
returned to Rome. A republic was briefly revived in 1434, but, 
by a year later, Pope Eugenius IV was able to reassert some 
control, and, although the more distant holdings of Rome remained 
for the most part independent, the succeeding popes were able 
to use their moral authority, and judicious use of condottieri, 
to once again become a major power in Italian politics. 
And so, by the 1440s, there were five major powers in 
Italian politics: the Papacy, Naples, Milan, Florence, and 
Venice. In between these states were many small, 
semi-independent "buffer" states, usually allied with their 
most powerful neighbor. For many years, these five major states 
existed in an uneasy equilibrium, none of them strong enough 
to battle all the others. Alliances were fairly stable, with 
Florence and Venice facing off against Milan. It was at this 
time that Venice first began sending resident agents. The first 
was probably Zacharias Bembo, sent to the papacy in 1435. This 
was, as all of the ones before it, an embassy of alliance. 
They also sent to the duke of Savoy and the Marquis of 
Montferrat. 30 
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The War of the Milanese Succession, 1452 to 1454, which 
was the true birthplace of the permanent resident embassy, was 
set off by the activities of Francesco Sforza, a condottieri 
who made a small state for himself from papal holdings and then 
married the daughter of Filippo Maria Visconti of Milan. He 
was soon turned on by his father-in-law, Pope Eugenius IV, and 
the lord of Rimini, Sigismondo Malatesta. Desperate for aid, 
he began to send out semi-official agents, among whom was 
Nicodemo dei Pontremoli, who was mentioned above. Although 
Pontremoli was probably not the first resident ambassador, he 
has another, almost equally important, role in Italian diplomacy. 
He was instrumental in convincing Cosimo d'Medici to abandon 
his age old alliance with Venice and ally himself instead with 
Milan, under Sforza's rule, against Venice. 31 We shall probably 
never know exactly why Cosimo made this decision, but the effects 
were quick and drastic. 
A complete and total reorganization of the alliance system 
of Italy was necessary to balance the new combined power of 
Milan and Florence. The war that this change spurred, the War 
of the Milanese Succession, ensured that this reorganization 
was done very quickly, and the fact that there was a war going 
on necessitated not only diplomatic contact but continuous 
diplomatic contact among allies, for it was necessary that all 
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the allies coordinate their military efforts to assure victory. 
How the alliances shifted is not really important. What 
is important is that, when they shifted, they spread residents 
throughout Italy. Every ally had resident embassies with every 
other ally, and these were fully accredited embassies, not semi-
official agents. However, they were still embassies of alliance 
and could very easily have gone home after the war was over 
if it had not been for the special nature of the treaty that 
ended the war in 1454, the Peace of Lodi. 
The new pope, Pope Nicholas V, managed to remain neutral 
throughout the war, and he was the main instigator of the peace 
process. still, peace might have taken much longer if it had 
" not been for the two major events of 1453, the fall of 
constantinople and the end of the Hundred Years' War. 
The fall of Constantinople caused a flurry of alarm in 
the Italian states, and fear of the Turk was at an all time 
high. Many fully expected Venice or Naples to be the next victim 
of Turkish attack, and so, naturally, the Italian states, in 
fear for their independence as Christian states, were ready 
to forget their internal differences, for the present at least, 
and present a united front against the common foe. 
The end of the Hundred Years' War presented a similar threat 
to Italian independence. For hundreds of years the Italians 
had been calling in the aid of the French in their squabbles, 
and, usually, the French came and left, leaving little 
destruction in their wake, but now, with the war with England 
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finally resolved, the French were able to turn their full 
attention to the Italian states. The Sforza-Medici alliance 
had called them in this time, but, faced with the battle hardened 
veterans of the Hundred Years' War massing on their northern 
border, even they were daunted and ready to make any peace that 
would keep the French out for good. 
And so the Peace of Lodi was settled, but, in order to 
ensure the independence of Italy against stronger aggressors, 
the Most Holy League was attached to it. This League first 
consisted of Florence, Venice, and Milan, but all of the major 
Italian powers eventually entered into it. It was a defensive 
alliance, good for 25 years, stating that each state would 
~ protect the Italian holdings of all the others and that any 
aggression by one partner would be opposed by all of the 
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others. But an alliance of this kind would require vigilance 
from all its partners, for none of them really expected that 
the others had truly given up their aggression. And so, rather 
than ending the system of resident embassies in Italy, the end 
of the war saw the spread of the system throughout the peninsula, 
among allies and enemies alike. This was the true beginning 
of permanent resident embassies. In order to keep the balance 
of power that the Most Holy League required, these embassies 
were maintained no matter how icy, neutral, or warm the relations 
between the states might be. From this point on, they were 
only interrupted by all out war. 
Which brings us at last to the role of these new resident 
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ambassadors. If their purpose was not to create or maintain 
an alliance, as it had been in earlier years, then what was 
it? According to Nicolson, IIthey bribed courtiers; they 
stimulated and financed rebellions; they encouraged opposition 
parties; they intervened in the most subversive ways in the 
internal affairs of the countries to which they were accredited; 
they lied, they spied, they stole. 1I33 While this may be a bit 
extreme, it is true that the office became an one of information 
gathering and behind-the-scenes maneuvering for position, and 
its sole purpose was not the good of all Christendom, as that 
of the medieval ambassador, but only the good of its own state. 
This is the major difference between the medieval and Renaissance 
" ambassador, and it was a difference that changed diplomacy 
forever. 
The spread of resident embassies throughout northern Europe 
in the next century is beyond the scope of this paper, but it 
is to that time that we must look to see the results of the 
drastic changes that resident embassies brought about. The 
relative secularism of the Italian states (the papacy excluded, 
of course) made the change there not so drastic, but, north 
of the Alps where the idea of Christendom was much stronger, 
it caused a crisis of conscience. If the resident ambassador 
existed only for the good of his own state, what place, then, 
did Christendom have in Europe? As the great states of northern 
Europe became more recognizably modern in outlook during this 
period, this question was asked about many of the new ideas 
and institutions that began to appear. For the resident 
ambassador, the question was inextricably bound up with 
diplomatic immunity. 
24 
The medieval ambassador's immunity rested upon two things, 
his personal representation of his principal, and his duty to 
Christendom. As the representative of his principal's person, 
he was as immune to interference as if he were the king or duke 
himself. As an angel of mercy working for the good of 
Christendom, it was against God Himself to delay or distress 
him, but the Renaissance resident ambassador had neither of 
these things on which to rest his immunity. He did not represent 
his principal's person, and he was often clearly not working 
~ for the good of all Christendom. So on what, then, did his 
immunity rest? 
Well, at first it rested on little more than tradition 
and was as little honored. In the early years of resident 
diplomacy beyond the Alps, ambassadors were often threatened, 
jailed, or worse, the most infamous case being that of the French 
ambassadors, Antonio Rincon and Cesare Fregoso, who were probably 
killed by agents of Charles V in 1541. Charles V never admitted 
to their murder, but it was generally agreed by all that they 
had forfeited their immunity because they were going to conclude 
an alliance with the Turk against the greater good of 
Christendom. 34 This is only one of numerous cases of violation 
of diplomatic immunity. One of the more bizarre cases concerns 
the secret Treaty of Vervins between France and Spain. The 
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articles were kept strictly confidential, but 150 years after 
the event, Leopold Von Ranke discovered a perfect copy in the 
Venetian archives. Apparently, the French courier carrying 
the articles to Spain: 
"was drugged in an inn in the south of France, the 
proprietor having been bribed. How delicate the 
operation was may be appreciated by the fact that the text 
of the treaty was within a soldered and sealed metal tube 
within the courier's pouch, which also was sealed and the 
pouch chained to the person of the courier. After the 
copy was made the text was restored and tube and pouch 
resealed with forged seals so perfectly fashioned that 
not even the Foreign Office in Madrid had any suspicion 
that the contents had been tamper}g with, when the courier 
turned it in to the chief clerk." 
Clearly, the old theory of diplomatic immunity was becoming 
virtually useless in reality and needed to be replaced. 
Its replacement was directly related to the Reformation. 
The Reformation wrought many great changes in Europe, and, among 
other things, it was directly responsible for the theory of 
exterritoriality that was to replace old theories of diplomatic 
immunity until the nineteenth century. Resident ambassadors 
lived for long periods on foreign soil, often in lands of foreign 
religion as well. It was essential to their principals that 
they be allowed to worship in the manner of their homeland, 
even while in the domain of another church. In fact, this issue 
caused a complete break in diplomatic relations between Spain 
36 and England in the late sixteenth century. The solution, 
practiced in reality long before it was formulated in theory, 
was a rule of international law which "derives support from 
the legal fiction that an ambassador is not an inhabitant of 
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the country to which he is accredited, but of the country of 
his origin and whose sovereign he represents, and within whose 
territory, in contemplation of law, he always resides.,,37 This 
theory solved the problem of religious toleration in diplomacy, 
but it is hardly a solution that a medieval ambassador could 
have understood. 
There is no reference here to the good of Christendom, 
no reference to religion at all, and so we can see how very 
far it is from medieval to Renaissance diplomacy. The good 
of the state has replaced the good of Christendom. The rule 
of law has replaced the rule of God, and the ambassador is "a 
man sent to lie abroad for his country's good" rather than a 
~ bringer of peace and goodwill. Of course, this is an 
oversimplification of the complex situation resident ambassadors 
found themselves in, but it is enough, I think, to show that 
the resident ambassador was a new breed, completely divorced 
from his medieval ancestors, facing a new world from a completely 
different vantage point. 
Notes 
1. Donald E. Queller, The Office of Ambassador in the 
Middle Ages (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1967), 84. 
2. Joinville and Villehardouin, Chronicles of the Crusades 
(Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books, 1963), 31. 
3. Donald E. Queller, Early Venetian Legislation on 
Ambassadors (Geneve: Librairie Droz, 1966), 49. 
4. Queller, Office, 185-186. 
5. Ibid., 16. 
6. Francois Louis Ganshof, The Middle Ages: A History 
of International Relations (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), 
297. 
7. Joinville and Villehardouin, Chronicles, 32. 
8. Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1963), 26. 
9. Garret Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (Boston: 
~ Houghton Mifflin Company, 1971), 45. 
10. Franklin Le Van Baumer, "The Church of England and 
the Common Corps of Christendom," The Journal of Modern History 
16, no. 1 (March 1944): 2. 
11. Queller, Venetian, 54-55. 
12. Garret Mattingly, "The Reputation of Doctor De Puebla," 
English Historical Review 55 (January 1940): 28. 
1 3 . Ibid., 32. 
1 4 • Ibid., 34. 
1 5 • Ibid., 31. 
1 6 . 
of Modern 
Garret Mattingly, "A Humanist Ambassador," The Journal 
~~~~~~H~l~'~s~t~o~r~y 4, no. 2 (June 1932): 175-176. 
17. Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, 65. 
1 8. Queller, Office, 81. 
19. G.E. do Nascimento e Silva, Diplomacy in International 
Law (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1972), 21. 
Notes (cont.) 
20. The best source I've found on this is G.P. Cuttino, 
English Diplomatic Administration: 1259-1339 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1971). 
21. J.E. Neale, "The Diplomatic Envoy," History 13, no. 
51 (October 1 928 ): 204. 
22. G.E. do Nascimento e Silva, Diplomacy, 21. 
23. Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, 74. 
24. Ibid., 72-75. 
25. G.E. do Nascimento e Silva, Diplomacy, 22. 
26. Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, 64. 
27. Quoted in Grant V. McClanahan, Diplomatic Immunity: 
Principles, Practices, Problems (New York: st. Martin's Press, 
1989),25-26. 
28. Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, 76-77. 
29. Ibid., 80. 
30. Ibid., 79-80. 
31. Garret Mattingly, "The First Resident Embassies: 
Medieval Italian Origins of Modern Diplomacy," Speculum 12, 
no. 4 (October 1937): 431. 
32. Ibid., 432. 
33. Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy, 43-44. 
34. Linda and Marsha Frey, "Fatal Diplomacy, 1541," History 
Today 40 (August 1990): 10-15. 
35. James Westfall Thompson and Padover, Saul K., Secret 
Diplomacy: Espionage and Cryptography 1500-1815 (New York: 
Frederick Ungar Publishing Company, 1965), 54-55. 
36. Gary M. Bell, "John Man: The Last Elizabethan Resident 
Ambassador in Spain," Sixteenth Century Journal 7, no. 2 (October 
1976): 88. 
37. Quoted in Clifton E. Wilson, Diplomatic Privileges 
and Immunities (Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press, 
1967),6. 
